Financial Stability and Casino Debt
David G. Schwartz and Eugene M. Christiansen C asino operators have always borrowed money to construct and improve their resorts. Beginning in 1999, however, the Las Vegas-based companies that dominate gambling in Nevada and many other jurisdictions began taking on unprecedented levels of debt. This debt load escalated from 2005 to 2009, and, though it has since leveled off, it has left casino operators more highly leveraged than ever before. Companies with such high levels of debt have consequently high interest payments, which leads to less money available for capital investment; it also makes them susceptible to default, should revenues weaken (as casino revenues did from 2008 onward). When extreme leveraging impacts a casino's financial performance and viability as a going concern, it may become a legitimate area of interest for regulators.
Recently, MGM Resorts International announced plans to issue $500 million in unsecured debt-not to pursue an expansion opportunity, but to pay down existing debt. Added to the company's existing $13.45 billion debt, the new issue will increase MGM Resorts' indebtedness to nearly $14 billion. With a market cap of $5.8 billion, MGM has a debt/capitalization ratio of approximately 240%. 1 Companies this highly leveraged (and with correspondingly high interest costs) are extremely sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow, and the past several years have proven that casino gaming, while it is still an industry with high profit potential, is prone to fluctuations in cash flow due to changes in consumer spending and competition from new jurisdictions. The historic levels of debt that many casino companies have taken on may threaten the future stability of individual companies and the gaming industry as a whole.
CAPITAL STRUCTURES
Corporate capital structures are often complex, constructed of varying percentages of equity and debt of various kinds at varying rates of interest and varying dates of maturity. Capital structures with low ratios of equity to debt are said to be ''highly leveraged.'' Highly leveraged capital structures aren't dangerous in and of themselves: high leverage can be an efficient use of equity. High leverage does, however, mean high interest expense. As long as credit is readily available and the borrower maintains its credit-worthiness (or credit rating)-meaning sufficient free cash flow to comfortably cover the cost of servicing its debt-all will be well. As we will see, all was well with highly leveraged casino company capital structures for years. Howard Stutz, MGM Resorts to issue $500 million in unsecured debt, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Jan. 11, 2012, available at < http://www.lvrj.com/business/mgm-resorts-toissue-500-million-in-unsecured-debt-137097693.html > ; MGM Resorts, Yahoo! Finance, < http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s = MGM > . DOI: 10.1089 DOI: 10. /glre.2012 DOI: 10. .1646 LAS VEGAS Table 1 presents total debt (''total owing''), the current portion of total debt, and the remaining or long-term debt in nominal (or current) dollars for the Nevada Gaming Abstract's largest category of Las Vegas Strip casinos 2 for the years 1990 through 2010, and calculates year-over-year percentage changes in this segment of Nevada's gaming industry's total indebtedness over this period. Total debt for this segment of Nevada's gaming industry increased from just under $1.1 billion in 1990 to $17.5 billion in 2010, an increase in total indebtedness of $16.5 billion, or 1,557.6%, over this period. Figure 1 presents the long term debt of Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual gross gaming revenues (GGR) of $72 million or more for the years 1990 through 2010 in line chart format. From 1990 through 1998, the long-term debt of large Strip casinos remained essentially stable below $2 billion. Long-term debt then increased sharply, rising fivefold, by $5.1 billion, to $6.3 billion in the year 2000. Long-term debt fluctuated around $6 billion between the years 2000 and 2004, and then increased even more sharply, reaching a series high of $19.7 billion in 2009 before declining to $17.4 billion in 2010-about $16.3 billion, or 1,630%, greater than the $1 billion in long-term debt of large Strip casinos in 1990.
GAMING LAW REVIEW AND ECONOMICS
As Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate, the indebtedness of large Strip casinos increased enormously in the decade following 1998. Almost all of the increase was in the form of long-term debt. The increase in indebtedness was a product of an era of easy credit that characterized the early years of this decade. Strip casinos entered the twenty-first century with a dominant position in the global market for destination resort gaming. The highly favorable market economics large Strip properties enjoyed translated into high and reliable cash flows, which made them ideal clients for financial institutions with unprecedented amounts of money to lend. The temptation to increase the leverage (the ratio of debt to equity) of their capital structures was hard for Strip resort management to resist. As long as Strip resorts continued to generate high 
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cash flows and credit remained readily available, high leverage appeared to be risk-free, an efficient use of equity.
As a result of these circumstances, the capital structure which provides the foundation on which the gaming industry rests was radically transformed. The transformation went largely unremarked in the financial press, and the attendant risks publicly traded casino companies were building into their balance sheets received little attention from Wall Street equity analysts covering the industry.
The risks, however, duly materialized, as the financial crisis of 2007 exposed fault lines in the gaming industry's capital structure that for some companies and resort development projects proved fatal.
In retrospect, the massive increase in gaming industry indebtedness that commenced in 1998 was singularly ill-timed. While the industry was leveraging up its balance sheet, the Las Vegas Strip's global monopoly of destination resort gaming was eroding. Macau opened its market to foreign investment in the year 2002, stimulating capital investment in gaming resorts that equaled and then surpassed the Strip-and generating gross gaming revenue that by 2008 made Macau the largest gaming market in the world. In 2010, two mega-destination gaming resorts opened in Singapore, further diluting the Strip's share of the global market for destination resort gaming.
Then, unexpectedly, in August 2007, the credit markets abruptly froze, precipitating the most serious financial crisis of modern times and triggering the worst economic contraction since the Great Depression.
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For gaming the timing could not have been worse. Casino companies entered the crisis with capital structures that were more highly leveraged than at any time since Nevada's Corporate Gaming Acts of 1967 and 1969 removed the barriers to the direct involvement of publicly traded corporations in the industry. 4 In 2008 alone, Las Vegas Strip casinos with revenues greater than $72 million added almost $7 billion of debt, a significant increase compared to the immediately preceding years. Several factors contributed to the increase in industry indebtedness, but the most important were two leveraged buyouts: of Harrah's Entertainment (now Caesars Entertainment) by Apollo Management and Texas Pacific Group, and of Station Casinos by Colony Capital and the company's founders, the Fertitta family. Neither buyout anticipated the 2007 fiscal crisis and the ensuing recession-why should they, when these events took most of the world by surprise? Things weren't helped by a large increase in the current portion of Strip casino resort debt in 2006, the largest, in nominal dollars, in this series, or by the fact that in 2006, the year before the financial crisis hit, Strip indebtedness was at a series high (Table 1) .
Further insight into how radically the industry's capital structure was changing in the years leading up to the financial crisis is provided by Figures  2-4 and Tables 2 and 3. with gross gaming revenue of $72 million or more, for the years 1990 through 2010. Table 2 presents these data in table format. After fluctuating around 50% of this segment of the industry's total capitalization between 1990 and 1994, total debt as a percentage of total capitalization fell sharply, reaching a series low of approximately 36% in 1998. Total debt as a percentage of this segment of the industry's total capitalization increased sharply in 1999 and then gradually decreased, to about 41% in 2005. Total debt as a percentage of this segment of the industry's total capitalization then again increased sharply, reaching a series high of 69% in 2010. Figure 3 presents the long-term portion of total debt as a percentage of total capitalization for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenue of $72 million or more for the years 1990 through 2010. As the foregoing figures and tables show, the large casino segment of the Las Vegas gaming industry entered the financial crisis of 2007 with sharply rising levels of debt. Debt in and of itself isn't dangerous as long as corporations (or governments) are able to service it. The usual measure of a corporation's ability to service its debt is the free cash available. The metric commonly used for free cash is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, or EBITDA. The ratio of cash available to service debt, including interest, repayment of principal, and lease payments (if any) is commonly referred to as the coverage ratio. The higher a corporation's coverage ratio, the easier it is for the corporation to obtain credit, other things being equal. Table 4 presents interest expense, EBITDA, and the EBITDA-to-interest coverage ratio for Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual gross gaming revenue of $72,000,000 or more for the years 1996 through 2010, in nominal or current dollars. Figure 5 presents the EBITDA-to-interest coverage ratio for Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual gross gaming revenue of $72,000,000 or more for the years 1996 through 2010, in nominal or current dollars. Figure 6 combines the interest expense, EBITDA, and coverage ratio data presented in Table 4 and Figure 5 into a single chart (note that the coverage ratio line in Figure 6 does not key to the chart's vertical index). Table 4 and Figure 5 show that the coverage ratio of the large segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming industry dropped precipitously from a series peak of nearly 17 times in 1997 to 2.6 times in the year 2000. Between the years 2000 and 2007 the coverage ratio of the large casino segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming industry fluctuated between two times and three times (with a dip below two times, to 1.9 times, in 2002). After 2008, however, reflecting the effects of the financial crisis, the coverage ratio of the large casino segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming industry fell sharply, reaching negative territory (-0.19 times) in 2009 before ,135,695,946 9,342,111,178 12.2% 1999 3,429,354,835 11,549,989,392 29.7% 2000 6,688,675,075 18,256,911,364 36.6% 2001 6,602,978,856 18,805,441,273 35.1% 2002 6,462,443,226 18,506,371,725 34.9% 2003 5,442,186,591 19,276,594,120 28.2% 2004 5,475,068,395 21,263,720,038 25.7% 2005 7,108,961,097 25,684,330,834 27.7% 2006 9,584,876,124 30,904,608,951 31.0% 2007 11,137,297,389 34,291,840,555 32.5% 2008 18,267,946,018 44,801,245,562 40.8% 2009 19,777,054,370 46,397,109,922 42.6% 2010 17,521,789,871 55,915,019,916 31.3% 
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recovering somewhat in 2010, albeit still below one times (0.85 times) in that year. Figure 6 shows that the reason for the coverage ratio of the large casino segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming industry's fall into negative territory in 2009 was the combination of an increase in interest expense and a very sharp decline in free cash or EBITDA. The descent of the Las Vegas Strip's large casino segment coverage ratio into negative territory in 2009 is a sign that the industry was experiencing acute financial distress. Corporations with negative coverage ratios are in imminent danger of default or bankruptcy.
Default and bankruptcy is exactly what Las Vegas encountered. For the gaming industry the one-two punch of suddenly frozen credit markets followed by severe recession constituted a perfect storm. Seemingly overnight, leveraged capital structures FIG. 5 . EBITDA-to-interest coverage for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or more (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1-July 30) income statements for this industry segment in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. The ''Clark County-Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over'' income statement reports accounting items for EBITDA (''Interest Expense'' + ''Net Income (-Loss) Before Federal Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items'' + ''Depreciation -Buildings'' + ''Depreciation and Amortization-Other'') and Coverage Ratio (EBITDA/''Interest Expense'').
FIG. 6.
Interest expense, EBITDA, and EBITDA-to-interest expense coverage for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or more (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1-July 30) income statements for this industry segment in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. The ''Clark County-Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over'' income statement reports accounting items for EBITDA (''Interest Expense'' + ''Net Income (-Loss) Before Federal Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items'' + ''Depreciation -Buildings'' + ''Depreciation and Amortization-Other'') and Coverage Ratio (EBITDA/''Interest Expense''). that had appeared sound became unstable. Without access to credit, debt could not be re-financed and rolled over. Worse, as the recession took hold, consumers reduced their visits to Strip properties and curtailed their spending in casino resorts. Casino cash flows dwindled. A wave of bankruptcies and cancelled construction projects rippled through the industry. Table 5 lists some notable Las Vegas Strip casino company defaults and halted resort developments following the 2007 credit crisis. The list is not exhaustive: some major problems precipitated or exacerbated by the credit crisis, including the financially troubled $9.2 billion CityCenter project, are omitted.
The twin impacts of the financial crisis and recession on the gaming industry were not confined to defaults and bankruptcies. The stock prices of publicly traded casino companies were also adversely affected. 
FINANCIAL STABILITY AS A REGULATORY CONCERN
The events of the last 18 months demonstrate that some widely held beliefs about casino gaming are myths. Gaming is not recession proof. Casinos are not automatically extraordinarily profitable-or profitable at all. Casinos will not automatically solve any and all problems and accomplish any and all public policy goals: e.g., attract millions of tourists, generate unlimited new tax revenues, employ thousands of people indefinitely and make investors rich.
Casinos can become financially unstable. Casinos can fail. They can fail quickly, or they can fail gradually, over a period of decades, through neglect and insufficient refreshment capital spending-as has happened in Atlantic City.
More often than not, such failure is caused by financial instability. Leveraged capital structures that reliably support casino companies for years, and even decades, can become unstable overnight if new competition materializes in neighboring jurisdictions, or credit markets close, or recession causes consumers to markedly reduce spending in casino properties.
This happened in Las Vegas in 2008 and 2009. What has happened once can happen again. Financially unstable casinos are likely to reduce labor costs in an effort to avoid default. In bankruptcy casino jobs and gaming's contribution to the economy, and the tax receipts gaming generates for government, may be lost altogether.
The financial stability of casino licensees is thus a legitimate regulatory concern. Financial stability is a regulatory concern in New Jersey, because in the late 1980s, the highly leveraged capital structures of some Atlantic City casinos did become unstable. Confronted with the prospect of the default or bankruptcy of its licensees, the New Jersey Casino Control Commission engaged financial advisors to provide it with a definition of financial stability. This definition of financial stability was duly incorporated into New Jersey's gaming regulations and is presented as an appendix. In the years since its adoption, financial stability has been an important part of New Jersey's regulation of its gaming industry. 
